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LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA AND
THE FUTURE OF ORIGINALISM
Richard Primus

The summer of 2015, when Hamilton: An American Musical opened on
Broadway, was also the summer when Donald Trump announced his can
didacy for the Republican presidential nomination. The shared timing was
more than coincidental; there was a reason why each of these projects
came on the scene during the last phase of America's first nonwhite presi
dency. The birther-in-chief's campaign for high office and Lin-Manuel Mi
randa's rap opera about the man behind the Federalist Papers spoke to the
same deep issues about American identity at a time when the nation's de
mography was increasingly coming to resemble that of the larger world.
They just approached the subject from different perspectives. One sought
to protect an America that was still mostly white and Christian against
Mexicans, Muslims, and other outsiders deemed dangerous. The other
was so confident in the multiracial future that it rewrote the American
past in its image. Trumpism and Hamilton are, in short, the same national
transition but from opposite sides of the looking glass. And the passions
that each has inspired are rooted partly in the desire to reject a vision of
America that the other represents.
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Chapter 1
The astounding success of each project has implications for the future

of constitutional law. The effects of Trump's election are obvious: The
Supreme Court is likely to have a Republican-appointed majority into the
indefinite future, continuing an unbroken run that began in 1970. While
Republican appointees control the Court, Miranda's project is unlikely to
have significant effects on legal doctrine. But among the Court's liberal
opposition—on and off the bench—Hamilton will contribute to a signifi
cant change. After several decades during which constitutional originalism has been mostly a right-wing art form, liberals will increasingly turn
to a jurisprudence of original meanings—and not merely as a way of try
ing to appeal to the originalists on the bench. Instead, liberals will turn
to originalism because they will increasingly believe, authentically, that
originalist methods support liberal positions in constitutional law. Even
tually, we'll see this development's ascendancy: when the day finally comes
that the Supreme Court has a liberal-leaning majority, that majority will
deploy originalism for liberal ends. Hamilton is part of the reason why.
Judges commonly understand the Constitution in light of their assump
tions about the Founding generation. The writing of the Constitution is
part of America's origin story. And if the history of constitutional law
shows anything, it shows that the "original meaning" of the Constitution
changes over time. Not the actual original meaning, of course. To the
extent that the Constitution has an actual original meaning, that meaning
is fixed by historical facts. But what shapes constitutional law is not the
actual original meaning of the Constitution. It is the operative original
meaning of the Constitution, meaning the original meaning as understood
by judges and other officials at any given time. The operative original
meaning of the Constitution is not entirely divorced from actual consti
tutional history, but it is also not a strict function of careful historical
inquiry. Instead, how judges imagine the original meaning of the Consti
tution depends on their intuitions—half-historical, half-mythical—about
the Founding narrative. If you can change the myth, you can change the
Constitution.
Hamilton is changing the myth. Originalism in constitutional law has
recently had a generally conservative valence not because the Found
ers were an eighteenth-century version of the Federalist Society, or the
Cato Institute, or the Family Research Council, but because readings of
Founding-era sources that favored right-leaning causes were generally
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predominant in the community of constitutional lawyers. Since 2015,
however, the millions of Americans who have listened obsessively
to Hamilton's cast album or packed theaters to see the show in person
have been absorbing a new vision of the Founding. The blockbuster mu
sical narrative of our times has retold America's origin story as the tale
of a heroic immigrant with passionately progressive politics on issues of
race and issues of federal power. And so the balance shifts:1 inspired in
part by this retelling, a new orientation toward the Founding will come
into view.
Hamilton offers this alternative vision at the dawn of a period when
liberals will find themselves attracted to rediscovering the Founders as po
litical and jurisprudential allies. The Court is likely to be distinctly con
servative, or libertarian, or some mixture of the two. One of originalism's
leading uses is as a tool of resistance to judicial authority. Within our legal
culture, an appeal to the Founders is an appeal over the judges' heads.
The Founders lack the power to reverse the Supreme Court, so in the here
and now that appeal to higher authority is a bid for hearts and minds
rather than damages and injunctions. But in a democratic society, hearts
and minds are worth winning. Moreover, many liberals will be opposed
to things the Court does, and they will want ways to articulate their op
position. Many liberals will accordingly do what many conservatives were
motivated to do by the Court of the 1960s: tell stories about the Founding
that vindicate their values against current judicial depredations. Hamilton
will help that process along. So for everyone who has learned to expect
originalist arguments to lead mostly to conservative results, here is your
Miranda warning: within a generation, American liberals may have devel
oped a jurisprudence of original meanings that, if deployed one day by a
liberal Court, could underwrite progressive constitutional decision-making
like nothing seen since the days of Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Twenty years ago, in an opinion curtailing the federal government's power
to regulate gun sales, Justice Antonin Scalia described Hamilton as the
most nationalistic of the Founders. It was not a compliment. It was a rea
son to discount an argument based on one of Alexander Hamilton's ar
guments in the Federalist Papers, an argument that would have upheld
broad federal power to regulate in the case at hand. The true Found
ing view, Scalia wrote, was better captured in a different essay by James
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Madison, who was (in Scalia's presentation) more skeptical of central au
thority.2 Hamilton was out of step.
Scalia was not wrong to think of Hamilton as a fervent supporter of
national government. But Hamilton's views were not as marginal as Sca
lia's treatment suggested. Any number of leading Founders were aggres
sive centralizers in 1787—Madison included. Writing for a majority of
the Supreme Court, however, Scalia's confidence in the Founders as localpower, small-government types enabled him to imagine Hamilton as an
outlier who could be dismissed. The same set of assumptions also framed
Scalia's reading of Madison's essay—an essay that would easily bear a
more nationalistic interpretation than Scalia gave it. I assume that Scalia
and the rest of the Court's majority made these interpretive moves in good
faith. Quite authentically, they thought of Hamilton as nonrepresentative and Madison as skeptical of central authority. Those attitudes sup
ported an interpretation of the sources that blocked an exercise of federal
lawmaking.
Hamilton, which opened in the last year of Scalia's life, will make it
harder for the next generation of American lawyers to think of Hamil
ton as marginal. A large and ecstatic audience now knows a narrative of
the Founding in which Hamilton is protagonist and hero. If that perspec
tive prevails, then future readers of originalist source material will hear
Hamilton's voice more loudly. Moreover, if Hamilton's ardent support for
centralized power is taken as the view of a leading figure, it will be easier
to read the writings of other Founders as leaning further toward national
authority. The sources will bear more nationalist readings than the Court
has given them in recent decades. The question is whether the judges
and commentators who do the reading will continue to expect Founding
texts to lean against federal power, as they have in the past generation,
or whether a substantial portion of the next generation of readers will
develop the intuition that the nationalism Hamilton represents was an
authentic Founding view.
The question is not whether Hamilton will change the way dedicated
conservatives view federal power. It is whether Hamilton will help people
who might be open to robust conceptions of federal power to see the
Founders as on their side and to deploy the cultural power of originalism
accordingly. The answer to that question is probably yes. One cannot
know in advance how any given influence will change people's intuitions
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about history, but in this case it is hard to overstate the preliminary indica
tions. Hamilton is a Pulitzer Prize-winning production whose cast album
went platinum faster than any album in the history of Broadway. The
audience has not just been listening; it has been rapt. In cooperation with
the Rockefeller Foundation, Hamilton's production company has staged
special performances for tens if not hundreds of thousands of students
in New York City's public schools. My personal experience suggests that
a significant proportion of teenage Michiganders can recite the lyrics. If
art can change ideas—and it can—then it looks like a new vision of the
Founding is ready to rise up.3
As a weapon of social change, Hamilton is trained directly on the intu
itions that previously made the Founding the differential property of con
servatives. In part, this is a matter of the substantive political values that
Miranda's protagonist represents, both on the issue of federal power and
on currently salient social issues like immigration. But Hamilton's larger
enterprise is exploding the politics of racial memory that have, in recent
decades, made liberals queasy about embracing the Founding too closely.
On that score, Hamilton attempts nothing less than regime change. Not
in the sense of replacing the president with a different president, but by
altering the way that Americans—of all races—think about the identity of
the republic.
The show takes barely thirty seconds to establish its perspective on
this issue. In the opening sequence, half a dozen rappers—all of them
nonwhite in the original production—take turns contributing verses to an
introduction of the title character. The third rapper in the series, describ
ing Hamilton's adolescence in the West Indies, speaks these words:
And every day while slaves were being slaughtered and carted
away across the waves, he struggled and kept his guard up
Inside, he was longing for something to be a part of
the brother was ready to beg, steal, borrow, or barter.4

Americans have told countless stories about the framers that margin
alize or omit slavery. Americans have also told many stories about the
Founding that seek to take slavery seriously. Hamilton did something new.
The same African American actor (in the original production at least)
who announces, in the play's first minute, that this story will neither hide
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slavery nor deny its brutality also refers immediately to the white title
character as a "brother."5 Hamilton, announces the nonwhite cast com
municating in a paradigmatically nonwhite genre, was one of us. Not be
cause of some bizarre claim that the first Treasury secretary was actually
not a white man. But because we—the cast members—see him as ours.
(The next rapper calls Hamilton "our man."6) In full knowledge that
Hamilton's race differentiated him from the slaves being slaughtered and
carted away,7 the cast uses racially laden terms of identification to describe
its connection to the story's protagonist. Our race matters, the company
implicitly declares. It shapes how we tell this story. But there is no hint
that the historical Hamilton's race matters, one way or the other.
Scrambling prevailing intuitions about race and the Founding in the
way that Hamilton does is not a method of helping audiences think ac
curately about the lives of nonwhite Americans in the eighteenth century.
If you think that theater has a responsibility to help the public get those
kind of historical understandings right, you might conclude that Ham
ilton's casting and its use of paradigmatically black musical genres are
gimmicks that whitewash historical injustice. But if you think that theater
can legitimately play a myth-making role, the required analysis is differ
ent. The question is then not whether Hamilton does justice to the past by
depicting it accurately but whether Hamilton builds justice in the present
by reallocating the ownership of the republic. Broad public absorption
of Hamilton's vision would not replace a false picture of the past with
a true picture. It would replace one false picture with a different false
picture. In scholarship, that substitution would not be an appropriate as
piration. But in the politics of national identity, the practical alternative to
the reigning myth is never a careful historical understanding. It is always
some other myth.
The leading Founders are figures of myth. That's precisely what makes
them potent in the rhetoric of law and politics. How people imagine myth
ical historical figures is at least as much a function of their own mental
maps as it is a function of dispassionate history. As long as the mental
maps of Americans feature deep social cleavages based on race, the his
torical fact that the Founders were white will figure in citizens' images
of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. But in a future America,
one that was thoroughly multiracial and egalitarian, a nonwhite image of
Washington might be no more jarring than dark-skinned images of Jesus
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have been among nonwhite Christian populations around the world. At
that future juncture, the argument that Hamilton misrepresents the eigh
teenth century would be a bit like the argument that originalism is a bad
way to make most constitutional decisions. As a matter of intellectual
analysis, it's a good point. But it's a complex and inconvenient point, and
it is unlikely to withstand the power of a good story. Hamilton tells a good
story, with thumping good music to help it along. By the time you leave
the theater, maybe even Washington is a little bit brown.
The success of Hamilton's project would mark an inflection point in
the politics of American memory. If nonwhite Americans can own the
story of the Founding without selling out their racial identities, then the
door is open for large numbers of Americans with liberal politics to claim
the Founders as their own. In part, that is simply because the median
nonwhite voter is to the left of the political center. But just as important is
the effect on white liberals, whose ability to embrace the Founders enthu
siastically has been tempered in recent decades by the fear that one cannot
celebrate those dead white men without risking complicity in the contin
ued marginalization of nonwhites. For the generations that revered Thurgood Marshall, a responsible perspective on the Founding had to show
critical distance. But if Miranda's frame replaces Marshall's, or even just
competes with it, then white liberals can be less ambivalent. Surely white
liberals can lay as much claim to the Founders as their nonwhite allies do.
What's more, Hamilton's demonstration that the story of the Founding
can be told from a liberal perspective is not limited to the subject of race.
The particular Founding Father whom Miranda's musical elevates was
not just an opponent of slavery but a city dweller and a passionate sup
porter of strong central authority in the national government. The musical
emphasizes all of these aspects of Hamilton's character. To be sure, Ham
ilton takes some politically motivated liberties with the historical record.
The historical Hamilton's antislavery attitudes were real, but they are ac
centuated in the musical. Similarly, the musical's relentless characteriza
tion of Hamilton as an immigrant in an important sense anachronistic:
it seems natural only because the audience thinks of the thirteen British
colonies that became the United States as a distinct entity in the interna
tional order. (Hamilton's journey from Nevis to New York occurred en
tirely within colonies of the British Empire.) The musical also repeatedly
uses the label "immigrant" to describe the Marquis de Lafayette, who was
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in no sense an immigrant. He was just a foreigner, a well-born Frenchman
who fought the British without ever intending to settle in America. In
short, Hamilton is a piece of musical theater, not an article in the Jour
nal of American History. But as musical theater goes, Hamilton is well
steeped in its historical sources. And a good musical can shape views of its
subject matter, even when audiences ought to know that they are watching
an exercise in myth-making. Hamilton's version of the Founding story will
accordingly creep into the consciousness of a large group of Americans.
That should have two mutually reinforcing effects. First, Hamilton will
prime people in the audience who interpret the Constitution for a living—
law professors, judges, and others—to think, consciously or otherwise,
that the historical sources will bear politically progressive readings. Sec
ond, it will change who is inclined to tell the story,8 rather than leaving
that story for someone else. If liberals of all races become confident sto
rytellers about the Founding, they will put their own spin on the sacred
sources, consciously or subconsciously, and across a broad range of is
sues. That sense of connection and ownership will be more significant
than Hamilton's raising the profile of any Founder or reorienting public
intuitions about how the Founders saw any particular issue. It is not that
liberal views of constitutional law will on all issues come to track the
views that the historical Hamilton held in the eighteenth century—many
of which play no role in the musical, and some of which modern liberals
might dislike. It is that by offering a version of the Founding that reso
nates with liberals today, Hamilton will encourage them to embrace the
Founding rather than run away from it. And when liberals appropriate
the Founding, they will (consciously or unconsciously) emphasize those
sources that can be made to do work for liberal causes in modern con
stitutional law. Some of those causes will coincide with the politics of
Hamilton, or those of Hamilton, or both. Others may not. But we can be
confident that the meanings that liberals give to the Founding, once they
are inclined to play the game of originalism, will be liberal-leaning mean
ings, just as the meanings that conservatives have given the Founding have
mostly leaned conservative. What matters is who tells the story.'
Hamilton's reframing may not be powerful enough to convince people
with conservative political principles that the framers of the Constitu
tion were liberals. But it can persuade people with liberal politics that the
framers have their backs, thus prompting them to tell the tale accordingly.
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H a m i l t o n is beyond compelling as art: people who hear the music once
want to hear it again and to hum it walking down the street. And Ameri
can liberals are not going to expend too much effort fighting the revised
myth they are being offered. They are going to need resources of resistance
to a conservative judiciary, and no resource has more capital in our legal
culture than the Founders. In addition, in a noninstrumental way, deep
down most liberals want to claim the mantle of the Founders just as much
as most conservatives do. It is nice to have Washington on your side.10
The liberal originalism of the future will not rest on one rap opera
alone. Cultural change has many inputs. Hamilton plays a role, and so
do the other things in the environment that made the musical possible.
The sheer fact of the Obama presidency helped nurture the intuition that
nonwhite Americans are full owners of the republic, thus opening a door
for Miranda to walk through—and provoking a white countermovement
desperate to slam it shut. If the American republic eventually repudiates
President Trump, the racial bigotry that brought him to power might be
further discredited. Farther downstream, Hamilton will mix with other
influences, some of which it will have directly nurtured and some of which
might have arisen independently. The combined effect will be transforma
tive. Nothing the Trump administration can do will prevent an American
future that is demographically different from the one in which today's
justices formed their worldviews. Hamilton is helping that future bring its
origin story along with it. And in the field of constitutional law, original
ism will keep the present connected to the Republic's Founding by making
sure that the Founding adapts. Just you wait.11
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